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Abstract
Research summary: Optimal distinctiveness theory
highlights that firms need to balance opposing pres-
sures for differentiation (to gain competitive benefits)
and conformity (to gain legitimacy). Yet, extant optimal
distinctiveness research rarely considers that the pres-
sure for conformity can substantially vary between
competing firms. Studying the positioning and growth
performance of competing platforms in the market for
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), we find that
platforms' access to high-status complementors—a
common source of legitimacy in platform markets—
substantially shapes the relationship between plat-
forms' distinctiveness and user growth. Our longitudi-
nal models show that platforms only benefit from a
(moderately) distinctive positioning once they have
buffered a certain amount of legitimacy. Our findings
strongly suggest that firms can alleviate conformity
pressures by accessing alternative sources of legitimacy.
Managerial summary: When does differentiation pay
off? We study this question in the increasingly impor-
tant context of platform markets to explain differences
in platforms' user growth. Our longitudinal study of
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competition in the market for Massive Open Online
Courses (MOOCs)—in which platforms like Coursera
and Udacity compete for online learners as users—
shows that the performance implications of a distinc-
tive positioning substantially depend on the legitimacy
that a platform has gained from attracting high-status
organizations as complementors. Platforms only benefit
from differentiation once they surpass a certain legiti-
macy threshold, and the legitimacy they gain beyond
this threshold accelerates the benefits of a (moderately)
distinctive positioning.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
When and to which degree should firms differentiate their strategic positions? Differentiated
positions can create both benefits and liabilities because they reduce competitive pressure
(Porter, 1980, 1985) but can also indicate a lack of conformity and may therefore threaten the
firm's legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999). Optimal distinctiveness theory highlights this tension and
proposes that there exists an “optimal” level of distinctiveness at which firms can balance the
opposing pressures for differentiation and conformity—a proposition that has gained much cur-
rency in strategic management and organization theory (for a review, see Zhao, Fisher,
Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017).
Recent optimal distinctiveness research started to challenge the assumption that there exists
a stable level of optimal distinctiveness (Barlow, Verhaal, & Angus, 2019; Haans, 2019; Zhao,
Ishihara, Jennings, & Lounsbury, 2018). This line of research suggests that the relative benefits
(reduced competition) and liabilities (reduced legitimacy due to insufficient conformity) of dis-
tinctiveness can systematically differ between market categories (Haans, 2019) and may change
over time as a market category becomes more institutionalized and crowded (Zhao et al., 2018).
What is typically less accounted for is that the liabilities of distinctiveness can substantially vary
within a market because conformity only represents only one potential source of legitimacy
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). The degree to which a firm can tap into other sources of legitimacy
(i.e., apart from conformity) will therefore determine the firm's pressure for conformity and
should consequently determine the extent to which distinctiveness will reduce legitimacy. This
oversight matters because what constitutes an optimally distinctive position for one firm may
result in poor performance outcomes for other firms in the same market.
We develop our arguments by theorizing about the optimal distinctiveness of positions in
platform markets, that is, product markets in which the focal firms (platform providers) enable
and facilitate transactions of goods and services between external producers (complementors)
and demand-side customers (users) via a technological product. Platform providers can gain
legitimacy by attracting complementors with high organizational status (high-status
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complementors) because affiliations with such organizations generally provide an important
“stamp of approval” (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Focusing on this important source of
legitimacy in platform markets, we explore how affiliations with high-status complementors
shape the relationship between platforms' distinctiveness—in terms of the positioning of their
complement portfolios—and user growth. Our main proposition is that alternative sources of
legitimacy—such as affiliations with high-status complementors—shield to some degree against
a loss of legitimacy due to distinctive (i.e., nonconforming) positioning because such legitimacy
buffers will expand the range of acceptability within which a platform can differentiate its posi-
tion without sacrificing its legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999; Fisher, Kotha, & Lahiri, 2016;
Haans, 2019). Buffered legitimacy, we argue, therefore allows platform providers to derive
greater benefits from a (moderately) distinctive positioning.
Our empirical study of competition in the market for Massive Open Online Courses
(MOOCs) between 2013 and 2017 provides strong support for our proposition. In this market
setting, platform providers like Coursera, Udacity, edX, and FutureLearn—and their respective
complementor ecosystems—offered competing MOOCs portfolios to attract users to their plat-
forms. The context is highly insightful for our research purpose because some platform pro-
viders compete with relatively undifferentiated portfolios, in which they offer MOOCs across
nearly all subject genres, while others carved out distinctive market positions. For instance,
Udacity differentiates its platform by focusing on MOOCs related to programming and com-
puter science, while Kadenze focuses on MOOCs related to arts and music. Our sample consists
of 12 competing MOOC platforms, which partnered with 963 complementors, including high-
status organizations like MIT, Stanford, Microsoft, and Google, and launched 5,871 new
MOOCs during our main observation period (2013–2017). Combining different data sources
allowed us to reconstruct each MOOC platform's complete portfolio of actively delivered
MOOCs and complementor affiliations in order to calculate the distinctiveness of MOOC plat-
forms' complement portfolio and ecosystem characteristics for each given month. Our fixed
effects times series models, which predict the number of platforms' monthly active users,
allowed us to fully isolate our main relationships from network effects, changes in the MOOC
market's legitimation and competitive pressure, and unobservable temporal dynamics at the
market level.
Our study finds that distinctiveness has a negative effect on user growth for platforms that
lack any high-status complementors in their ecosystem—suggesting that the liabilities of dis-
tinctiveness (reduced legitimacy) fully exceed the competitive benefits of distinctiveness for
platforms without such a legitimacy buffer. In turn, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship
between distinctiveness and user growth for platforms that attracted a minimum share of high-
status complementors—suggesting that platforms with such a legitimacy buffer can convey
some degree of nonconformity without sacrificing their legitimacy. An increase in the share of
high-status complementors also leads to a substantial steepening of the inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between distinctiveness and user growth for such platforms—suggesting that a moder-
ately distinctive position enhances user growth the more a platform has buffered legitimacy
through high-status complementors. This contingency is of high practical significance because
a standard deviation increase in distinctiveness (from low to moderate) increases the expected
number of platform users by 1.7 million (+55.1%) for platforms with an above-average share of
high-status complementors, but decreases the number of users by 2.9 million (−53.5%) for plat-
forms without high-status complementors in their ecosystem. These findings strongly suggest
that access to even one alternative source of legitimacy—high-status complementors—can pro-
vide a buffer against an immediate loss in legitimacy, and such legitimacy buffers increase—to
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a certain degree—the optimal level and performance benefits of distinctiveness. These findings
have important implications for research on optimal distinctiveness (Barlow et al., 2019;
Haans, 2019; Taeuscher, Bouncken, & Pesch, 2020; Zhao et al., 2018) because they draw atten-
tion to intra-market heterogeneity in firms' optimal distinctiveness—highlighting firms' legiti-
macy buffers as an important contingency for the theorized trade-off between differentiation
and conformity.
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Positioning in platform markets
Our theorization focuses specifically on the performance consequences of distinctive position-
ing in platform markets. Following the common conceptualization in strategic management
(McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017), we refer to platforms as technological products that serve to
enable and facilitate transactions of goods or services (complements) between independent pro-
ducers (complementors) and demand-side customers (users). Exemplary platform markets
include the market for online food delivery—where platform providers like Grubhub facilitate
transactions of meals between restaurants and consumers—or the market for crowdfunding—
where platform providers like Kickstarter facilitate financial transactions between
crowdfunders and crowdfunding-seeking ventures. To distinguish the context from related
ones, strategic management scholars sometimes also specify such platforms and platform mar-
kets as transaction platforms (Dushnitsky, Piva, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2020) and multisided trans-
action markets (Cennamo, 2019).
Platform providers generally act as gatekeepers that deploy governance rules to strategically
influence the type of complementors and complements they attract to their platform (Claussen,
Kretschmer, & Mayrhofer, 2013; Logue & Grimes, 2019; Rietveld, Schilling, & Bellavitis, 2019;
Zhang, Li, & Tong, 2020). For instance, platform providers in the video game market can
restrict platform access to games of one specific genre (e.g., sports) in order to carve out a dis-
tinctive position in the market (Cennamo & Santaló, 2013). Following previous research on
platform competition (e.g., Cennamo & Santaló, 2013; Seamans & Zhu, 2014, 2017), we thus
focus on positioning at the level of complement portfolios and conceptualize distinctiveness as
the degree to which a platform's complement portfolio deviates from the market's average com-
plement portfolio.1
A key feature of platforms is that they generate positive network externalities between com-
plementors and users (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; Clements & Ohashi, 2005; Corts &
Lederman, 2009; Eisenmann, Parker, & van Alstyne, 2011). Given these indirect network
effects, platforms generally become more attractive to users if they attract additional com-
plementors and vice versa (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015). Under the presence of strong network
effects, a platform market may even generate winner-take-all dynamics (Schilling, 2002),
through which the platform with the largest network will eventually dominate the market
1A general caveat in research on strategic positioning is that the observed distinctiveness of a market position does not
necessarily result from a deliberate strategic decision but may also emerge unintentionally (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, &
Lampel, 2009). This caveat also applies to platform markets, where a platform may attract a distinctive complement
portfolio without the strategic intent to do so. While a distinctive complement portfolio likely indicates a platform
provider's differentiation strategy, we do not rely on such an assumption in our subsequent theorization.
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(Sun & Tse, 2007). These market characteristics generally incentivize platform providers to rap-
idly grow their user base and complementor network (Cennamo & Santaló, 2013). The impera-
tive for rapid growth is further accelerated for platforms provided by new ventures, who
commonly prioritize rapid user growth over profitability (Huang, Henfridsson, Liu, &
Newell, 2017). Our subsequent theorizing thus focuses on user growth as a critically important
performance outcome in platform markets.
2.2 | Distinctiveness and user growth
Optimal distinctiveness theory provides a powerful theoretical perspective to study the perfor-
mance implications of distinctiveness (Zhao et al., 2017). Integrating arguments from strategic
management and institutional theory, the theory suggests that the relationship between distinc-
tiveness (i.e., nonconformity) and firm performance is mediated by a positive and negative
mechanism because distinctiveness reduces competitive pressure, but a lack of conformity also
decreases the firm's legitimacy in the market (Deephouse, 1999). Applying the proposition to
our context implies that distinctiveness—as a characteristic of a platform's positioning—will
reduce both the platform's competitive pressure and legitimacy. The left plots in Figure 1 graph-
ically illustrate these two mechanisms, with the gray line representing the effect of distinctive-
ness on competition—expressed in positive terms as competitive benefits—and the solid black
line representing the negative effect of distinctiveness on legitimacy. We subsequently discuss
FIGURE 1 Graphic illustration of the theorized effects of distinctiveness. Note: The illustration is inspired
by Haans (2019) but differs in that the positive mechanism (Competitive benefits) is inversed to facilitate the
illustration of the shift in the Legitimacy curve. The illustrative curves in the left-hand plot represent a platform's
Legitimacy and Competitive benefits as an inverse logit function (exp(b0 + b1X + b2X
2)/(1+ (exp
(b0 + b1X + b2X
2)), where X represents Distinctiveness and is bounded to values between 0.0 (low) and 1.0 (high).
We specified the beta coefficients for the inverse logit function for Competitive benefits (gray line) as b0 = −4,
b1 = −12, and b2 = 0. We specified the beta coefficients for the inverse logit function of Legitimacy in baseline
Scenario 1 (solid line) as b0 = 6, b1 = −12, and b2 = 0, and the corresponding beta coefficients for Scenario
2 (with legitimacy buffer, dashed) as b0 = 8, b1 = −12, and b2 = 0. The right-hand plot represents the sum of
Competitive benefits and Legitimacy for the baseline scenario (solid line) and Scenario 2 (dashed) to illustrate a
relative change in a platform's number of users. In both scenarios, Competitive benefits are assumed to be equal
or larger than the loss of Legitimacy
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the key assumptions underlying these two mechanisms to develop our baseline hypothesis
about the relationship between distinctiveness and user growth in platform markets.
Distinctiveness generally allows a platform to compete in a less contested market space and
to prevent head-to-head competition with other platforms (Deephouse, 1999; Porter, 1985)—as
long as existing competitors are not already equally positioned across the entire market space
(Haans, 2019). A distinctive position can further increase the fit between the platform's offering
and users' preferences in the selected market niche (Porter, 1985)—therefore increasing the
platform's relative attractiveness in the eyes of such niche users (Chernev, 2007). This effect will
be particularly prevalent in those platform markets in which users exhibit strong heterogeneity
in their tastes and preferences (Rietveld & Eggers, 2018; Taeuscher, 2019). If switching costs
between platforms are relatively low, users may also choose to use several differentiated
platforms—rather than one platform that offers a broad but undifferentiated portfolio—in order
to maximize the fit between their contextual needs and platforms' offering. For instance, a user
in the MOOC market—our empirical context—may both use a MOOC platform specialized in
programming courses when learning a new programming language and a MOOC platform spe-
cialized on business courses when aiming to develop new management skills. Counter to the
observation that platform markets often exhibit winner-take-all dynamics, such conditions (het-
erogeneity in user preferences and low switching costs) can thus allow several distinctive plat-
forms to sustainably co-exist in the same market (Cennamo & Santaló, 2013; Eisenmann,
Parker, & van Alstyne, 2006). Our graphical illustration of these combined competitive benefits
(left panel of Figure 1) follows previous optimal distinctiveness research (Haans, 2019) and rep-
resents the relationship between distinctiveness and competitive benefits as an S-shaped curve.
The relationship is generally positive, but only to a minimal degree at very low levels of
distinctiveness—which are insufficient to differentiate the platform in the eyes of potential
users—and high levels of distinctiveness—at which a platform already occupies a unique mar-
ket position and therefore does not derive any competitive benefits from further differentiation
(Haans, 2019).
Distinctiveness simultaneously affects a platform's legitimacy—a “generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574)—because a distinctive
(i.e., nonconforming) market position can prevent potential users from recognizing the platform
as a member of its product market (Deephouse, 1999) and consequently cause users to disregard
the platform as a legitimate transaction partner (Zuckerman, 1999). Platform users may further
lack a comparative baseline for evaluating a platform's quality when they cannot situate the
platform in a specific market (Durand & Kremp, 2016), and these uncertainties will reduce their
likelihood to join the platform (Podolny, 1994). Being distinctive thus increases the likelihood
that potential users do not perceive the platform as a legitimate choice. Previous research sug-
gests that users will perceive a platform as legitimate as long as it is positioned within a “range
of acceptability”—the range around a market's average position within which a platform is suf-
ficiently similar to be perceived as a legitimate choice (Deephouse, 1999). Hence, a loss of legiti-
macy only occurs once a platform is positioned outside the range of acceptability, and platforms
can thus exhibit some degree of distinctiveness without the immediate loss of legitimacy (see
Haans, 2019, for an illustration). Once a platform is positioned outside this range of acceptabil-
ity, it risks being disregarded as a legitimate choice by potential users. The left plot of Figure 1
illustrates this mechanism as an S-shaped relationship between distinctiveness and legitimacy.
The marginal loss in legitimacy is minimal at low levels of distinctiveness because the platform
is still positioned within the range of acceptability and therefore perceived as a legitimate
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choice. Positioning the platform outside the range of acceptability will, however, result in a
rapid loss of legitimacy. Once a platform has completely lost its legitimacy, it does not suffer
from further increases in distinctiveness and the relationship between distinctiveness and legiti-
macy consequently flattens out at high levels of distinctiveness.
The solid black line in the right plot of Figure 1 illustrates how the two latent mechanisms
(legitimacy, competitive benefits) jointly affect a platform's user growth. The illustrative plot
assumes an additive effect between the two mechanisms and therefore adds the values of the
competitive benefits curve and legitimacy curve. At low levels of distinctiveness, the marginal
competitive benefits exceed the marginal loss in legitimacy, and an increase in distinctiveness
therefore yields a positive net effect on the platform's user growth. In turn, distinctiveness will
unfold a negative net effect on user growth at distinctiveness levels at which the marginal loss
in legitimacy exceeds the marginal increase in competitive benefits. This curvilinear relation-
ship, where increases in distinctiveness have a positive marginal effect on user growth until the
curve's turning point (the point of optimal distinctiveness) and a negative marginal effect
beyond this point, is also in line with the baseline prediction in previous optimal distinctiveness
studies (Deephouse, 1999; Zhao et al., 2017). We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). There exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between platforms' distinc-
tiveness and user growth.
2.3 | The moderating role of high-status complementors
We subsequently theorize about how the relationship between distinctiveness and user growth
is shaped by access to alternative sources of legitimacy. We specifically focus on the role of
high-status complementors as a particularly relevant source of legitimacy in platform markets.
Status refers to the “[s]ocially constructed, inter-subjectively agreed-upon and accepted ordering
or ranking of individuals, groups, organizations, or activities in a social system” (Washington &
Zajac, 2005, p. 284). Affiliations with high-status individuals or organizations represent one of
the most important sources of legitimacy for new ventures in general (Fisher, Kuratko,
Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Rao, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999;
Überbacher, 2014), but the legitimating effect of such affiliations is particularly prevalent in
platform markets. That is because the value created by platforms is inherently co-created by
complementors—independent organizations or individuals that provide complementary goods
and services (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Affiliation with high-status complementors—that is,
complementors that are members of the high-status group in their organizational field—can
provide an important source of legitimacy of platforms because it implies a positive legitimacy
judgment (Pollock, Lee, Jin, & Lashley, 2015) and stakeholders generally place a strong weight
on positive legitimacy judgments by high-status organizations (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, &
Hambrick, 2010). High-status complementors' decision to join a platform ecosystem thus
implies a positive evaluation of the platform' legitimacy—thereby increasing the platform's
legitimacy in the eyes of other stakeholder groups.
Our main proposition is that high-status complementors—and alternative sources of legiti-
macy in general—provide a “legitimacy buffer” (Fisher et al., 2016) that enlarges a platform's
range of acceptability and therefore increases the level of distinctiveness at which a platform
starts losing legitimacy. Platform providers can stockpile legitimacy from different sources
(Suchman, 1995), and stockpiled legitimacy can shield a platform against potential legitimacy
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challenges. Among others, such a legitimacy buffer will increase the leeway for nonconforming
behavior without the immediate loss of legitimacy (Fisher et al., 2016). Hence, affiliations with
high-status complementors provide a legitimacy buffer that can shield a platform—to some
degree—against the negative consequences of distinctiveness. Platforms that have buffered
legitimacy through high-status complementors can thus exhibit a higher level of distinctiveness
without the immediate loss of legitimacy because legitimacy gained through high-status com-
plementors (one source of legitimacy) reduces pressure for conformity (another source of
legitimacy).
The dashed black line in the left plot of Figure 1 illustrates how access to high-status
complementors—through the legitimacy-buffering effect—can right-shift the distinctiveness–
legitimacy curve.2 A platform with access to high-status complementors can, ceteris paribus,
exhibit a higher degree of distinctiveness without losing any legitimacy. However, even a high
degree of buffered legitimacy does not prevent a reduction in legitimacy if the platform is posi-
tioned outside an (enlarged) range of acceptability. Hence, platforms with access to high-status
complementors will equally lose some legitimacy if they exceed a certain level of
distinctiveness—although the legitimacy loss at a given level of distinctiveness will be lower in
comparison to platforms without such a legitimacy buffer. In other words, legitimacy buffered
through high-status complementors provides more leeway for distinctiveness but does not
completely protect against a loss in legitimacy. Attracting a higher share of high-status com-
plementors will thus shift the distinctiveness–legitimacy curve to the right, where the partial or
complete loss of legitimacy occurs at a relatively higher level of distinctiveness.
The dashed black line in the right plot of Figure 1—which adds the competitive benefits
curve (gray line) and the changed legitimacy curve (dashed black line)—illustrates how such a
right-shift in the legitimacy curve may affect the overall relationship between distinctiveness
and user growth. The illustration builds on the assumption that an increased share of high-
status complementors does not substantially change the competitive benefits of distinctiveness
(gray line) because legitimacy buffering does not necessarily position a platform in a less con-
tested market space. The plot suggests that access to high-status complementors will (a) shift
the curve's turning point to the right and (b) steepen the positive and negative slope of the
curve. A steepening of the curve implies that platforms with high-status complementors will
attract more users at moderate levels of distinctiveness—that is, distinctiveness levels at which
a platform without high-status complementors would lose some degree of legitimacy and a plat-
form with high-status complementors does not yet lose its entire legitimacy. Hence, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). High-status complementors will moderate the relationship between plat-
forms' distinctiveness and user growth in that a higher share of high-status complementors
will shift the curve's turning point to the right.
2Legitimacy is generally conceptualized as an asset that is clearly bounded (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, Suchman, &
Mark, 2017). As illustrated in the left plot of Figure 1, a platform is legitimate (1), illegitimate (0), or legitimate to some
degree (values in between) but cannot gain or lose legitimacy outside these bounds (Deephouse et al., 2017). The
conceptual characteristics of legitimacy imply that a fully legitimate platform cannot become “more legitimate” in the
eyes of users through access to high-status complementors. Hence, the legitimacy curve does not move upwards beyond
this upper bound (1).
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). High-status complementors will moderate the relationship between plat-
forms' distinctiveness and user growth in that a higher share of high-status complementors
will steepen the curve.
3 | RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 | Study context and data
We test our hypotheses by studying platform competition in the market for Massive Open
MOOCs between January 2013 and March 2017. Launched with the mission to deliver world-
class education to millions of learners across the world, MOOCs—broadly defined as online
courses aimed at large groups of learners—have been considered one of the most important
innovations of the education industry in the last century (Belleflamme & Jacqmin, 2016).
MOOC platforms target a broad range of users through technological platforms on which users
can search for, enroll in, and engage with a platform's MOOC portfolio. The MOOC market
gained global recognition in 2012, driven by substantial coverage in mainstream media
(Reich & Ruipérez-Valiente, 2019). For instance, the New York Times publishes several articles
about MOOCs during that year and declared 2012 as “The Year of the MOOC”
(Pappano, 2012). The MOOC market provides a highly insightful context to study optimal dis-
tinctiveness in platform markets because the market represents a clearly distinguishable plat-
form market—characterized by a unique label (“MOOCs”), specific product characteristics
(e.g., free access to educational content), specialized market intermediaries (e.g., the meta-site
Class Central), and coverage by market analysts (e.g., Absolute Reports, 2019).3 The MOOC
market is further suited to test our hypotheses because different subject genres allow for clear
market segmentation and therefore provide various opportunities for differentiation. Starting
our observation window in 2013—that is, after the market had already gained recognition by
the general public and 12 competitors had already entered the market—should also ensure that
platform providers competed with each other rather than purely focused on collectively legiti-
mating the MOOC market and differentiating it from other market categories (Navis &
Glynn, 2010, 2011). The fact that the major MOOC platforms were provided by new ventures—
who did not simultaneously compete in other markets—further increases confidence that
changes in platforms' user growth result from platform providers' behavior in the MOOC mar-
ket rather than their unobserved behavior in other markets.
Our initial sample includes all MOOC platforms launched up until December 2015. To iden-
tify all MOOC platforms and their complementors, we make use of the meta-site Class Central
(classcentral.com), which claims to list all MOOC platforms and MOOCs. We collected data for
all MOOC platforms listed on Class Central to develop our measure of Distinctiveness, but
restricted our sample to MOOC platforms provided by new, growth-oriented ventures to rule
out that platform providers could buffer legitimacy through unobserved behavior in other mar-
kets (e.g., in the case of platforms provided by multibusiness corporations). Focusing on
3MOOC platforms primarily competed with other MOOC platforms during our observation period (2013–2017). After
this period, some MOOC platforms also started to compete directly with universities and other education providers by
offering educational programs with formal degree credentials, competitive admission processes, and personalized
learning support (Reich & Ruipérez-Valiente, 2019). Hence, the boundaries of the MOOC market likely have become
more blurred since 2017.
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platforms provided by new, growth-oriented ventures should further ensure that all sample
firms aimed for user growth. To identify MOOC platforms provided by new, growth-oriented
ventures, we aimed to match each platform provider with the four million companies listed in
the startup database Mattermark. This database, targeted primarily at venture capitalists and
other startup investors, provides comprehensive data points about growth-oriented ventures,
and we thus considered a platform provider's inclusion in this database as an indicator of its
growth ambition. Our sample thus consists of all MOOC platforms (identified through the
MOOC meta-site Class Central) offered by new, growth-oriented ventures (identified through
the startup database Mattermark). These two criteria resulted in an initial sample of 15 MOOC
platforms. We subsequently reviewed these platforms manually to verify whether they aligned
with our conceptualization of platforms (e.g., multisidedness) and aligned broadly with the
basic characteristics of the MOOC market. We excluded three MOOC platforms from the sam-
ple because they did not align with these criteria (e.g., only providing self-created content). Our
final sample consists of 12 MOOC platforms and these 12 platforms accounted for 92% of all
MOOCs listed on Class Central at the end of our observation period.
Platform-months are our unit of analysis. Our study encompasses all platform-months
between 2013 and 2017. The sample is unbalanced because some platforms entered the market at
later points, and one platform filed for bankruptcy before the end of the observation period. We
chose monthly observations to observe users' immediate reactions to changes in the positioning of
platforms' MOOC portfolio. Our final sample encompasses 330 platform-month observations.
We leveraged the comprehensive data on Class Central to gather data points about each
MOOC delivered on all MOOC platforms. We used web-crawling algorithms to access the data
points provided by Class Central, including each MOOC's subject genre, the organization that
created the MOOC (i.e., the complementor), and the dates at which a MOOC had been deliv-
ered in the past. Information about past start dates of each MOOC's delivery and the number of
weeks over which each MOOC is taught allowed us to reconstruct each platform's entire portfo-
lio of MOOCs for each month. An average MOOC is taught over a period of 9.4 weeks, and
most MOOCs in the sample were delivered multiple times during our observation period. For
instance, if a given MOOC is taught over 8 weeks and previously started in April 2014 and April
2016, we considered this MOOC to be part of the respective platform's complement portfolio for
April 2014, May 2014, April 2016, and May 2016. During our observation period, MOOC plat-
forms launched 5,871 new MOOCs and all MOOCs delivered in these platforms during the
observation period accounted for 68,478 MOOC-month observations.
3.2 | Dependent variable
Our dependent variable aims to capture each platform's number of users in a given month. We
benefit from the fact that users of MOOC platforms enroll in and engage with MOOCs directly
via a platform provider's website, and we can thus infer platforms' number of users directly
from the number of monthly unique visitors of platform providers' websites.4 The metric of
4This behavioral measure is particularly suited to represent changes in a MOOC platform's number of users as it
accounts for potential users' decision to join a platform and existing users' decision to continue using the platform. This
makes this measure preferable over counts of the number of registered users, which tend to overestimate the number of
actual users. In fact, research on the behavior of MOOC platform users suggests that the majority of newly registered
users never return to a MOOC platform in subsequent periods (Reich & Ruipérez-Valiente, 2019). Hence, the number of
monthly unique visitors presents a more reliable indicator of the actual number of platform users in a given month.
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monthly unique visitors has been shown to represent a common and reliable metric to measure
the growth performance of online platforms and internet-based firms in general
(e.g., Gnyawali, Fan, & Penner, 2010; Kerr, Lerner, & Schoar, 2014; McDonald &
Eisenhardt, 2019). We use data from the startup database Mattermark, which provides weekly
data points for the metric of monthly unique visitors via an application programming interface
(API). The metric is skewed as the largest platform (Coursera) attracted nearly 10 million
unique users in its most successful month, while the smallest platform attracted only a few
thousand visitors during its least successful month. To re-scale variation and reduce skew, we
thus construct our dependent variable—Users—as the natural logarithm of the number of
monthly unique visitors. Graphical analysis of the distribution of Users revealed seven
platform-months in which a platform attracted less than 10,000 users—mostly in the month in
which a respective platform just entered the market. To increase the robustness of our findings,
we thus eliminated the first observation month for platforms that entered the market during
our observation period.
3.3 | Independent variables
Distinctiveness is the main independent variable of our study, representing the degree to which
a given platform' MOOC portfolio deviates from the average MOOC portfolio in the market in a
given month (in terms of subject genres). We follow previous research, which also
operationalized the distinctiveness of a platforms' complement portfolios (Cennamo &





where git is the proportion of MOOCs in subject genre j among all MOOCs launched on plat-
form i in period t, and gt is the proportion of MOOCs in subject genre j among all MOOCs deliv-
ered in period t. Calculating the market average based on all MOOCs delivered in a given
period (including those offered on platforms excluded from the analysis) allows us to increase
the stability and practical relevance of this reference point (we expand this point in our discus-
sion of robustness tests). We follow the genre classification provided by Class Central, which
consists of 12 different subject genres (e.g., business, natural sciences, and computer sciences).
Low Distinctiveness thus indicates that a platform's MOOC portfolio closely mimics the market's
average (i.e., prototypical) MOOC portfolio (in terms of its subject genres) and high Distinctive-
ness indicates that the MOOC portfolio substantially deviates from the average MOOC
portfolio.
High-status complementors represents a platform's share of complementors that exhibits a
high organizational status. Our operationalization of high-status complementors aimed to align
with the common approach in the organizational status literature, which generally conceptual-
izes status as a binary variable and classifies a small percentage of actors in an industry or social
setting as high-status (typically around 5 %) based on their position in context-specific rankings
(George, Dahlander, Graffin, & Sim, 2016). For instance, Ertug, Yogev, Lee, and
Hedström (2016) classify art galleries and art museums as high status if they appear in the top
100 in respective rankings of art galleries and art museums. Other recent studies select firms
that appear within the top 25 of their respective rankings (Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2016;
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Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Following these approaches, we aimed to identify a relevant
ranking for each of the two respective complementor populations (universities, non-universi-
ties) in order to classify a small subset of each population as high status.5 To avoid introducing
a systematic bias between the two types of complementors, we aimed to classify a similar share
of universities and non-universities as high status. To operationalize the status of universities,
we relied on the Times Higher Education (THE) university ranking, which represents one of
the leading global rankings for universities (Aguillo, Bar-Ilan, Levene, & Ortega, 2010). After
analyzing the rank distribution among MOOC-providing universities in our sample, we decided
to classify universities as high status if they were among the ranking's top 25 universities. This
corresponds to around 3% of all MOOC-providing universities during the observation period.
To identify high-status actors among the non-university complementors, we used the industry-
independent Global Brand ranking (Brand Finance, 2017), which ranks firms by their brand
value and should therefore provide a suitable approximation of organizations' perceived status
in the eyes of general consumers (i.e., potential users of MOOC platforms). We classified non-
universities as high status when they are listed in the top 100 of this ranking (e.g., Google,
Microsoft) because this benchmark equally classified 3% of the non-universities as high status.6
We subsequently constructed our measure of High-status complementors by measuring the
share of each platform's complementors that are classified as high status in a given month. We
preferred this relative measure of high-status complementors over an absolute measure because
an absolute measure would confound the effect of high-status complementors with general net-
work effects. We lagged both independent variables by 1 month to mitigate potential concerns
about reverse causality.
3.4 | Control variables
Due to the presence of network effects, MOOC platforms likely attract more users after an
increase in their MOOC portfolio. We thus control for the number of new MOOCs added to a
platform's MOOC portfolio in a given month to account for changes in portfolio size. New
MOOCs represents the natural logarithm of the number to newly launched MOOCs on a plat-
form in a given month, lagged by 1 month. The measure focuses on the number of newly added
MOOCs—rather than a platform's cumulative number of MOOCs—because previous research
suggests that cumulative measures of network size can easily overstate indirect network effects
(Rietveld & Eggers, 2018).
We further aimed to control for additional differences in platforms' complementor ecosys-
tem (beyond their status). Platform research provides substantial evidence that exclusive com-
plementors can increase a platform's attractiveness to users (Cennamo & Santaló, 2013; Corts &
Lederman, 2009; Landsman & Stremersch, 2011). We thus include exclusive complementors as a
measure of a platform's proportion of complementors that only creates MOOCs for the given
platform but does not contribute to any other platform. While a strategy focused on exclusive
complementors can increase a platform's attractiveness to users, it may simultaneously limit
5The distinction between universities and non-universities follows the classification of complementors on Class Central.
In our sample, 278 complementors (29.5%) classify as non-universities.
6In robustness tests, we used different cut-off points for each of these rankings to classify roughly 1% and 5% of the
respective samples (e.g., top 10 and top 50 universities) as high status. Our main findings proved robust under different
coding procedures.
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the platform' supply-side growth and may therefore also unfold a negative effect on the plat-
form's user growth (Cennamo & Santaló, 2013). To capture this potentially nonlinear effect, we
also include a squared term of this measure (Exclusive complementors2) in our models. In our
sample, 792 out of 963 complementors offer MOOCs on only one platform. We further aimed to
net out any systematic differences between the two types of complementors—universities and
non-universities—and therefore include a control variable (Non-university complementors) that
measures the proportion of non-university complementors among all complementors of a plat-
form in a given month.
We further aimed to control for changes in platform-level characteristics. We add Platform
age—measured in months since the platform offered the first MOOC on Class Central—to con-
trol for any unobservable dynamics that occur over a platform's lifecycle stage. In particular,
potential users may be more hesitant to join a MOOC platform in its early stages (Cennamo &
Santaló, 2013). We also included a binary variable—Certification—which is 1 for all months in
which a platform offers verified certificates and “0” in all other months. During the observation
period, several MOOC platforms started to offer learners the opportunity to purchase a certifi-
cate after they successfully completed a MOOC. Certificates may increase the platform's attrac-
tiveness because they allow users to signal their educational progress to potential employers.
We additionally control for the presence of a Mobile app with a dummy variable that equals
1 in months in which the platform offers a mobile app and 0 otherwise. We used data provided
by AppAnnie.com to determine whether and when a given platform first launched a mobile
app. We time-lagged Certification and Mobile app by 1 month.
We additionally control for the Number of MOOC platforms, measured as the total number
of MOOC platforms that list at least one MOOC on Class Central in a given month because the
number of competing MOOC platforms may determine both the level of competitive pressure
and affect the market's overall legitimacy (Navis & Glynn, 2010).
3.5 | Statistical method and instrumentation approach
Many time-invariant platform-level factors—such as differences in the quality of their technol-
ogy, management, or home market—could affect MOOC platforms' observed growth perfor-
mance. Following common practices in platform research (Boudreau, 2012; e.g., Boudreau &
Jeppesen, 2015; Cennamo & Santaló, 2013), we leverage the panel structure of our data and
apply a fixed-effects approach that fully controls for cross-sectional variation. Fixed effects
models allow isolating our time-variant variables (i.e., all variables described above) from static
differences that exist between platforms and between platform providers. After including plat-
form fixed effects, the remaining error term in the estimation of Users can be interpreted as dif-
ferences in unobserved platform quality that may occur over the observation period. To also
control for systematic changes that occurred over the course of our observation period, we addi-
tionally include year dummies. These dummies allow us to control for technological advances,
shifts in consumer demand, and other time-dependent effects. We further include month
dummies to account for potential seasonality in MOOC demand. Including these dummies sub-
stantially reduces the risk of omitted variables.
A central proposition of platform research is that the network size of demand-side users and
supply-side complementors mutually influence each other (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Such
simultaneous causality represents a major driver of endogeneity (Semadeni, Withers, & Trevis
Certo, 2014). Hence, an increase in New MOOCs likely leads to an increase in Users, but an
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increase in Users may simultaneously lead to an increase in New MOOCs. We aimed to account
for this potential endogeneity problem through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation
approach, in which the first-stage models regress New MOOCs on all independent variables
(including platform, year, and month dummies) and an additional exogenous variable. The
second-stage model subsequently regresses Users on all other independent variables (including
platform, year, and month dummies) and the first-stage estimation of New MOOCs. We there-
fore aimed to identify an exogenous variable that causally affects New MOOCs but does not
affect Users (Wooldridge, 2010). Online Appendix S1 provides an in-depth discussion of our
identification strategy and the construction of our excluded instrument (Labor costs). To further
prevent concerns of potential reverse causality, we lag the measure by 12 months. This time
frame accounts for the average delay between organizations' decision to create a MOOC and
the launch of a MOOC (Hollands & Tirthali, 2014).
4 | RESULTS
Table 1 presents summary statistics and correlations. The table shows a relatively high correla-
tion between Platform age, Number of MOOC platforms, and year dummies. The main models
nevertheless include all control variables as fixed effects time series generally do not suffer from
multicollinearity problems (Goldberger, 1991). In robustness tests, we confirmed that the pres-
ented relationships do not change if we exclude Platform age and/or Number of MOOC plat-
forms from our models (excluding them generally increased the statistical significance of our
hypothesis-testing relationships). Table 2 presents the second-stage models that estimate Users.
All models are estimated with STATA's ivreg2 command (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2002).
Online Appendix S2 presents results for the respective first-stage regressions—that is, predicting
the endogenous variable New MOOCs—and online Appendix S3 represents the full second-stage
results, including all platform, year, and month dummies. The models and additional post hoc
tests confirm that Labor costs satisfies both instrumental variable conditions
(Wooldridge, 2010): (a) a partial correlation with New MOOCs after all other exogenous vari-
ables are netted out (at p = .000), and (b) no correlation with the error term of the second-stage
model (r = −0.001, p = .981). In each of the models, we additionally present test statistics to test
for potential under-identification and weak identification in our instrumentation approach
(Semadeni et al., 2014). Anderson canonical correlations statistics (using a Lagrange Multipler)
suggest that the models do not suffer from under-identification problems (at p = .000 in all
models) and the Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic consistently exceeds the suggested benchmark
values provided by Stock, Yogo, and Andrews (2005) at the most conservative level7 and there-
fore suggests that the models do not suffer from weak identification problems.
Model 1 includes the controls and the single term of Distinctiveness to evaluate whether a
linear specification would provide a better fit than a curvilinear relationship. The low statistical
significance of Distinctiveness in Model 1 suggests that Distinctiveness does not have a linear
effect on Users. Model 1 further shows that High-status complementors has a positive direct
7Stock et al. (2005) provide benchmark values for the Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic that account for test size, bias, the
number of excluded instruments and endogenous regressors. For one endogenous regressor, one excluded instrument,
and our sample characteristics, the critical benchmark for 10% (the most restrictive value) is at an F-value of 16.38. A
test statistic larger than this critical benchmark allows to reject the hypothesis that the relative bias from the instrument
is 10% or larger of the initial bias (from the excluded endogenous variable).
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effect on Users and therefore provides some support for the assumed legitimation effect of high-
status complementors. The model also shows a strong positive effect of Exclusive complementors
and negative effect of Exclusive complementors2, which indicates that a moderate share of exclu-
sive complementors attracts most users. The model further suggests that Non-university com-
plementors and Mobile app have a positive effect on Users.
Hypothesis 1 stated that distinctiveness has an inverted U-shaped effect on platforms' user
base. Model 2 adds Distinctiveness2 to test for the predicted curvilinear relationship. A minimum
condition for an inverted U-shaped effect would be a positive coefficient for Distinctiveness and
a negative coefficient for Distinctiveness2. Model 2 demonstrates that neither of the coefficients
shows the expected sign. The low statistical significance of Distinctiveness and Distinctiveness2
suggests rejecting Hypothesis 1—the relationship between Distinctiveness and Users does not
unconditionally follow an inverted U-shaped curve.
TABLE 2 Second-stage results of 2SLS estimation for users
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Distinctiveness −0.036 0.196 .855 −0.778 0.621 .210 −2.033 0.753 .007







High-status complementors 2.009 0.933 .031 2.286 0.938 .015 −2.939 2.157 .173
Non-university
complementors
2.593 0.331 .000 2.575 0.326 .000 2.941 0.355 .000
Exclusive complementors 2.875 0.794 .000 2.764 0.785 .000 3.345 0.787 .000
Exclusive complementors2 −2.780 0.761 .000 −2.633 0.755 .000 −3.259 0.758 .000
New MOOCs 0.482 0.211 .022 0.459 0.209 .028 0.583 0.248 .019
Platform age 0.003 0.014 .849 0.003 0.014 .835 0.004 0.014 .758
Certification −0.041 0.120 .735 −0.050 0.118 .669 −0.094 0.128 .464
Mobile app 0.622 0.142 .000 0.601 0.141 .000 0.745 0.174 .000
Number of MOOC platforms 0.021 0.017 .234 0.023 0.017 .178 0.025 0.018 .168
Platform dummies included Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies included Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.916 0.666 .000 13.055 0.669 .000 12.907 0.890 .000
Anderson canon. corr.a 23.96 (p = .000) 23.63 (p = .000) 18.87 (p = .000)
Cragg-Donald Wald Fb 23.02 22.06 17.56
p .000 .000 .000
aThe Anderson canonical correlations statistics, using a Lagrange Multipler (LM) version, tests for under-
identification of the instruments.
bThe Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic tests for weak instrument identification.
Abbreviation: MOOCs: Massive Open Online Courses.
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Hypotheses 2 and 3 stated that high-status complementors moderate the relationship
between distinctiveness and user growth in that a higher share of high-status complementors
shifts the turning point to the right (Hypothesis 2) and steepens the curve (Hypothesis 3). Model
3 adds interactions between Distinctiveness and High-status complementors and Distinctiveness2
and High-status complementors. We first plotted predictions for Users at different levels of Dis-
tinctiveness and High-status complementors to visually examine the relationship. Figure 2 repre-
sents these predictions at different levels of Distinctiveness—ranging from 0 (i.e., no
distinctiveness) to 1 SD above the sample mean (i.e., high distinctiveness). We aimed to predict
Users at four meaningful levels of High-status complementors by specifying the sample's mini-
mum value (0.00), the sample mean (0.08), 1 SD above the mean (0.19), and 2 SD above the
mean (0.30). The plots in Figure 2 reveal the strong impact of High-status complementors on the
relationship between Distinctiveness and Users. Under the absence of high-status com-
plementors, the relationship technically follows a U-shaped curve. At a mean share of High-
status complementors, the relationship technically follows an inverted U-shaped curve. At these
low levels of High-status complementors, Distinctiveness has a purely negative effect on Users—
platforms attract most users by demonstrating high conformity in their complement portfolio's
positioning. At above-average levels of High-status complementors, the curve steepens, and the
curve's turning point slightly shifts to the right. We followed the procedure presented by Haans,
Pieters, and He (2016) to formally test for a right-shift of the turning point (Hypothesis 2).8 The
equation's numerator yields a positive value and therefore suggests a right-shift of the turning
point at higher levels of High-status complementors. To test the statistical significance of such a
FIGURE 2 Relationship between distinctiveness and users at different levels of high-status Complementors.
Note: The plot represents estimations for Users (i.e., the natural logarithm of the number of users), based on results of
Model 3, at different levels of Distinctiveness (between 0 and 1 standard deviation (SD) above the mean) and at four
levels of High-status complementors. The four curves correspond to the sample's minimum share of High-status
complementors (0), mean, 1 SD above the mean (“Mean + 1 SD”), and 2 SD above the mean (“Mean + 2SD”)
8We estimated the following equation: (β1*β4 - β2*β3)/(2*(β2+ β4*Z)
2), where β1 represents the slope for Distinctiveness,
β2 is the slope for Distinctiveness
2, β3 is the slope of the interaction between Distinctiveness
2 and High-status
complementors, β4 is the slope of the interaction between Distinctiveness
2 and High-status complementors, and Z is the
main term for High-status complementors. Higher levels of High-status complementors lead to a right-shift of the turning
point when (a) the equation's numerator is positive and (b) the coefficient of the equation is significantly different from
zero at meaningful values for Z Haans et al., 2016).
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right-shift, we calculated the turning point for different levels of High-status complementors
(from 0 to 0.5 at increments of 0.01). Online Appendix S4 presents the full results for each level.
The table shows that low values of High-status complementors lead to relatively high standard
errors and broad 95% confidence intervals—suggesting that no significant turning point shift
occurs at relatively low levels of High-status complementors. This finding is in line with the plot
in Figure 2, which shows that the curve flips from U-shape to inverted U-shape at low levels of
High-status complementors (which effectively prevents a continuous turning point shift in this
range). The table further lays out that this formal test suggests a statistically significant turning
point shift at higher levels of High-status complementors (0.3 and higher). The combined evi-
dence suggests rejecting Hypothesis 2, showing that there exists no continuous shift in the turn-
ing point over the entire range of High-status complementors due to the curve's U-shape at low
levels of High-status complementors. However, the tests and plot in Figure 2 suggest that the
position of the turning point (i.e., the “optimal” level of distinctiveness) is contingent on High-
status complementors and an increase in High-status complementors leads to a right-shift of the
turning point for platforms that have surpassed a certain share of high-status complementors.
A negative and statistically significant interaction term between Distinctiveness2 and High-
status complementors would provide formal support for Hypothesis 3 (Haans et al., 2016). Model
3 shows a negative coefficient for the interaction between Distinctiveness2 and Users, and the
respective standard error and p-value (.000) suggest that this relationship has a high statistical
significance. This finding provides strong support for Hypothesis 3 and suggests that the
inverted U-shaped relationship between Distinctiveness and Users substantially steepens at
higher levels of High-status complementors.
We further calculated the level of High-status complementors at which the relationship
between Distinctiveness and Users flips from a U-shaped to an inverted U-shaped relationship.
Using the formula provided in the study by Haans et al. (2016), we find that the curve flips at a
High-status complementor value of 0.055. Our study therefore suggests that the relationship
between Distinctiveness and Users follows a slightly U-shaped relationship if less than 5.5% of a
platform's ecosystem consists of high-status complementors and an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship for platform ecosystems with more than 5.5% of high-status complementors.
We ran various tests to confirm the robustness of our results. Online Appendix S6 presents
models in which we confirmed the robustness of our findings for different operationalizations
of Distinctiveness. The first models calculate Distinctiveness vis-à-vis the market's average posi-
tion (gt ) over longer time periods (3, 6, 9, and 12months)—rather than the average position in
the given period—to account for the fact that platform users may perceive changes in a market's
average position only over longer time horizons. These alternative operationalizations of Dis-
tinctiveness are thus less sensitive to temporal changes in the market's average position. The
models show that our findings are robust under these alternative operationalizations of
Distinctiveness.
We further aimed to confirm that our findings are insensitive to the chosen measure of plat-
forms' supply-side growth. Online Appendix S7 presents alternative models, in which the first-
stage models estimate the logged number of MOOCs that a platform delivers in a given month
(Delivered MOOCs) instead of the logged number of MOOCs that are newly launched on a plat-
form in a given month (New MOOCs). These alternative models confirm that our findings do
not depend on the selected operationalization of the platforms' supply-side growth.
Recent research highlights that the competitive benefits of a distinctive positioning substan-
tially depend on the heterogeneity of competitors' market positions (Haans, 2019). Our fixed-
effects models can fully account for temporal changes in the heterogeneity of MOOC platforms'
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positions, but we nevertheless aimed to verify that such heterogeneity does not drive our find-
ings. We closely replicated the measure of Distinctiveness heterogeneity in the study by
Haans (2019) by counting the sum of standard deviations of genre distributions over all 12 sub-
ject genres. In line with our measure of Distinctiveness, we calculated the measure based on all
MOOCs delivered in a given month (not just those delivered by our sample platforms). Alterna-
tive models, presented in online Appendix S8, show that our results do not change if we addi-
tionally control for Distinctiveness heterogeneity.
We further aimed to rule out that our findings are driven by systematic temporal changes in
Distinctiveness and High-status complementors. The MOOC market was in a relatively early
stage during our observation period, and previous research suggests that platform providers
may have gradually increased their platforms' distinctiveness over time as the market category's
legitimacy may have increased (Navis & Glynn, 2010, 2011). Similarly, market-level legitimation
could have also facilitated platforms' access to high-status complementors over time. To for-
mally test whether our independent variables systematically increased over time, we con-
structed alternative models in which we regressed either Distinctiveness or High-status
complementors on all control variables. For a systematic temporal effect, we would expect a sta-
tistically significant effect of Platform age or the Number of MOOC Platforms in the respective
models. Online Appendix S9 presents these alternative models. Standard errors and p-values in
these models suggest that none of the time-dependent control variables has a statistically signif-
icant effect on either Distinctiveness or High-status complementors.
Plotting and clustering the empirically observed distribution of platform-month observa-
tions in our study indicates that MOOC platforms with distinctive positions less frequently
attracted a high share of high-status complementors than those with undifferentiated posi-
tions.9 This distributional pattern could indicate that distinctive positioning may reduce a plat-
form's ability to attract high-status complementors. To test for such an additional
interdependency between our independent variables, we regressed High-status complementors
on Distinctiveness and all control variables. If distinctive positioning would reduce access to
high-status complementors, we would expect a negative effect of Distinctiveness on High-status
complementors. The model in online Appendix S9 shows a slightly positive coefficient (0.024)
for the relationship between Distinctiveness and High-status complementors, but the respective
standard error and p-value (.085) imply that this effect is not statistically significant at conven-
tional threshold levels. This result suggests that distinctive positioning does not affect a plat-
form's access to high-status complementors.
These robustness tests and respective plots confirm that Distinctiveness has a negative effect
on Users (which technically represents a slightly U-shaped relationship) under the absence of
High-status complementors and an inverted U-shaped effect on Users at high levels of High-
status complementors. Our robustness tests further confirm that higher levels of High-status
complementors lead to a right-shift in the curve's turning point (although the right-shift is rela-
tively small) and a steepening of the curve under the condition that High-status complementors
surpasses a minimum level. These tests provide substantial support for our main proposition
that platform' optimal distinctiveness is substantially contingent on their affiliations with high-
status complementors.
9Dividing our sample's platform-month observations into four groups—by splitting Distinctiveness and High-status
complementors by their means—shows that 18% exhibit low Distinctiveness and low High-status complementors, 28%
exhibit low Distinctiveness and high High-status complementors, 38% exhibit high Distinctiveness and low High-status
complementors, 15% exhibit high Distinctiveness and high High-status complementors.
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Figure 3 further predicts and plots the effect of Distinctiveness on the absolute number of
users to quantify the practical significance of our main findings. A standard deviation increase
in Distinctiveness—under the prior absence of Distinctiveness—will lead to (a) a decrease of 2.9
million users (−53.5%) for platforms without high-status complementors, (b) a decrease of 1.1
million users (−24.8%) for platforms with an average share of high-status complementors, (c)
an increase of 1.7 million users (+55.1%) for platforms with an above-average share of High-sta-
tus complementors (standard deviation above mean) and (d) an increase of 4.9 million users
(+219.9%) for platforms with a high share of High-status complementors (2 SD above mean).
These large absolute effect sizes emphasize the practical significance of this contingency:
whether a platform has buffered some legitimacy through affiliations with high-status com-
plementors determines whether a given change in distinctiveness will substantially decrease or
increase the platform's user growth.
5 | DISCUSSION
Optimal distinctiveness research highlights the tension between differentiation and conformity,
suggesting that an “optimal” level of distinctiveness exists, at which firms can balance the com-
petitive benefits of distinctiveness against the loss of legitimacy that results from non-confor-
mity. Drawing on legitimacy research (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Fisher et al., 2016; Zimmerman &
Zeitz, 2002), we argued that such an isolated view of the tension between differentiation and
conformity may be overly simplistic because conformity only represents one of several potential
sources of legitimacy. We suggested that legitimacy buffered through different sources of
legitimacy—other than conformity—can reduce a firm's pressure for conformity and therefore
protects to some degree against the liabilities of distinctiveness. Hence, we proposed that the
FIGURE 3 Relationship between Distinctiveness and the absolute number of users at different levels of
high-status Complementors. Note: The plot represents estimates for the absolute number of users, based on
reverse transformation of the results of Model 3, at different levels of High-status complementors. To estimate
unbiased predictions for the absolute number of users, we included an estimate of the error variance (using the
square of the prediction's root mean squared error) in the reverse transformation (Wooldridge, 2010)
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distinctiveness–performance relationship ultimately depends on the degree to which a firm has
buffered legitimacy.
Our study of competition in the MOOC market provided empirical support for our argu-
ments by showing that the relationship between MOOC platforms' distinctiveness and user
growth is highly contingent on a platform's share of high-status complementors. We predicted
an inverted U-shaped relationship between platforms' distinctiveness and user growth, but our
study suggests that such a curvilinear relationship only exists for platforms that have surpassed
a minimum threshold of high-status complementors. Platforms that have surpassed this thresh-
old enhance their growth through moderately distinctive positions, and the growth benefits of a
moderately distinctive position are accelerated at higher shares of high-status complementors.
These findings have important practical implications as they (a) highlight the substantial
impact of an “optimally” distinctive position on platforms' growth performance, (b) reveal that
distinctiveness can harm user growth for platforms that lack high-status complementors in their
ecosystem, (c) show that a moderately distinctive position enhances user growth for platforms
with a minimum share of high-status complementors in their ecosystem, and (d) suggest that
platforms can accelerate the growth benefits of a moderately distinctive position by increasing
the share of high-status complementors in their ecosystem.
Our study directly contributes to optimal distinctiveness research that explores the impact
of distinctive positioning on demand-side performance outcomes in entrepreneurial, dynamic,
and heterogeneous market environments (Barlow et al., 2019; Haans, 2019; Taeuscher
et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2018)—a shift from the traditional focus on positioning in highly stable
market environments (e.g., Deephouse, 1999). This line of research advances understanding of
the distinctiveness–performance relationship by delineating important contingencies that shape
the benefits and/or liabilities of distinctiveness. Zhao et al. (2018), who studied competition in
the video game market, found that highly conforming positions enhance video game sales dur-
ing a category's emergence stage, whereas moderately distinctive positions enhance sales in cat-
egories that have surpassed a certain evolutionary threshold. Among others, their study showed
that the competitive benefits of a moderately distinctive position can substantially increase over
time as competitive intensity rises within a category. Haans (2019) highlighted that the competi-
tive benefits of a distinctive position fundamentally depend on the heterogeneity of competitors'
positions in a given market category. His multi-industry study showed that the distinctiveness–
performance relationship can systematically differ between categories, where the performance
benefits of a distinctive positioning are greatest in categories in which competitors occupy rela-
tively similar positions. Taeuscher et al. (2020) outlined that evaluating audiences differ in their
tolerance of nonconformity and appreciation of novelty and distinctiveness, and highlighted
that such audience-level characteristics can shape both benefits and liabilities of distinctiveness.
Studying optimal distinctiveness in the context of crowdfunding, they find that the benefits of
distinctiveness can strictly exceed the opposing liabilities in contexts in which audiences dem-
onstrate a high tolerance of nonconformity and actively seek out novel and distinctive offerings.
Our findings extend these previous studies in challenging the existence of a stable and uncondi-
tional point of optimal distinctiveness that would allow firms to achieve superior performance.
Our study goes beyond these previous studies—which primarily emphasize how the
distinctiveness–performance relationship is contingent on contextual characteristics—by show-
ing that the performance consequences of distinctiveness can even differ within the same mar-
ket category and for the same evaluating audience. Our study strongly suggests that direct
competitors in a market category can face heterogeneous liabilities of distinctiveness and may
therefore derive fundamentally different performance outcomes from being distinctive.
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Our study further contributes to platform research in strategic management (Boudreau &
Jeppesen, 2015; Cennamo & Santaló, 2013; Rietveld & Eggers, 2018; Seamans & Zhu, 2017;
Zhu & Iansiti, 2012) by highlighting the role of legitimacy as a driver of platform performance.
Attending to the tension between differentiation and conformity complements prior platform
research, which primarily focuses on economic mechanisms to explain performance outcomes
in platform markets (Afuah, 2013; Cennamo & Santaló, 2013; Rietveld et al., 2019; Rietveld &
Eggers, 2018; Seamans & Zhu, 2017; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). In particular, our study advances
understanding of optimal positioning in platform markets, where previous research
(Cennamo & Santaló, 2013) studied positioning in the video game market—a context in which
mature firms like Microsoft and Sony compete as platform providers—and found a U-shaped
relationship between platforms' distinctiveness and performance. Contrasting our findings with
these previous findings suggests that platforms provided by new ventures—such as those in our
study—may benefit much less from distinctive positioning than those provided by mature firms
because mature firms may have developed substantial legitimacy buffers throughout their orga-
nizational lifecycle. Hence, platform providers' lifecycle stage may provide an important bound-
ary condition that potentially limits to some degree the generalizability of previous findings in
platform research, and attending more directly to platform providers' lifecycle stage and legiti-
mation allows for important research opportunities for future platform research (but see Garud,
Kumaraswamy, Roberts, & Xu, 2020; Logue & Grimes, 2019).
Our finding that a distinctive positioning can have purely negative performance
implications—under the absence of legitimacy buffers—also sheds new light on the perfor-
mance implications of differentiation more broadly (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Ethiraj &
Zhu, 2008; Hill, 1988; Porter, 1980). Specifically, it challenges the assumption that some degree
of differentiation always enhances firms' demand-side performance. Our study of differentiation
in an entrepreneurial setting, in which several competitors lacked legitimacy due to their new-
ness and the newness of the market category, strongly suggests that some degree of legitimacy
may be necessary to reap the differentiation benefits identified in previous studies. This finding
therefore uncovers an assumption that is critical but unarticulated and taken-for-granted in the
differentiation literature.
We are confident that our findings are generalizable beyond the context of MOOC plat-
forms, although within certain boundary conditions. Anchoring to previous optimal distinctive-
ness studies, we first expect that our findings are most generalizable to market categories in
which distinctiveness yields some competitive benefits because there exists some degree of com-
petitive intensity (Zhao et al., 2018) and opportunities to reduce competitive intensity through
differentiation (Haans, 2019). Second, our findings regarding the curvilinear effect of distinc-
tiveness are generalizable to contexts in which there exists some pressure for conformity, but
they may not hold up in contexts in which evaluating audiences tolerate a high degree of non-
conformity and/or expect a high degree of novelty and distinctiveness (Taeuscher et al., 2020).
Third, our arguments about the legitimacy-buffering effect of high-status complementors can
be extended to other sources of legitimacy, and our empirical findings for the moderating effects
of high-status complementors should also be generalizable to other contexts in which affilia-
tions with high-status organizations can provide a visible stamp of approval (Stuart et al., 1999).
There may exist some limits to the generalizability of our empirical findings to market catego-
ries in later lifecycle stages because a market category's development stage influences the oppos-
ing pressures for conformity and differentiation (Navis & Glynn, 2010, 2011). The pressure for
prototype conformity may increase over time as the market category and categorical prototype
become more established (Navis & Glynn, 2010), and differentiation pressures may
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simultaneously increase if competitive intensity rises within the market category (Zhao
et al., 2018). The MOOC market's early development stage may have affected our empirical
findings, but we believe that our general propositions equally apply to market categories in later
development stages.
Our study is not without limitations, and these limitations offer some future research oppor-
tunities. First, our study focuses on differentiation at the level of platforms' complement portfo-
lio, but there may also exist other opportunities for platform differentiation. For instance,
MOOC platforms may potentially differentiate themselves by attracting exclusive com-
plementors or complementors with a unique style of delivery. This opens new research opportu-
nities to theoretically elaborate, for instance, on the role of complementor exclusivity in
platform markets (Corts & Lederman, 2009; Landsman & Stremersch, 2011) or the orchestra-
tion of optimal distinctiveness across multiple dimensions of differentiation (Zhao et al., 2017).
A second limitation may result from the exogenous treatment of high-status complementors'
decisions to create MOOCs for a specific platform. Future research could complement our study
by exploring how platform-level properties, such as its business model (Zott & Amit, 2008),
affect high-status complementors' decision to affiliate with specific platforms. Third, while affili-
ations with high-status organizations are generally conceptualized as a source of legitimacy,
they may also differentiate a platform to some degree in the eyes of users. Future research may
therefore attempt to directly measure the latent mechanisms that mediate the distinctiveness–
performance relationship, although such efforts may require different data sources—such as
experiments—that are not easily compatible with longitudinal panel data. Fourth, we tested
our theoretical proposition for one specific source of legitimacy, but platforms may also access
other sources of legitimacy to buffer against the liabilities of distinctiveness. Future studies
could, for instance, draw on the rich literature in cultural entrepreneurship (Lounsbury &
Glynn, 2001; Navis & Glynn, 2011) to study how firms can mitigate the tension between differ-
entiation and conformity through identity claims, narratives, or other symbolic actions. We thus
encourage future research to explore how firms can effectively buffer legitimacy in order to alle-
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